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Although early attempts at land titling in Africa were 
often unsuccessful, the need to secure rights in view of 
increased demand for land, options for registration of 
a continuum of individual or communal rights under 
new laws, and the scope for reducing costs by combining 
information technology with participatory methods have 
led to renewed interest. This paper uses a difference-
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in-difference approach to assess economic impacts of a 
low-cost registration program in Ethiopia that, over 5 
years, covered some 20 million parcels. Despite policy 
constraints, the program increased tenure security, land-
related investment, and rental market participation 
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Two factors have led to increased recent interest in land registration and formalization of property rights 
to land in Africa. First, most African countries have, since the 1990s, passed new land legislation to 
remedy some of the perceived shortcomings of existing systems, in particular to strengthen customary 
land rights, recognize occupancy short of full title, improve female land ownership, and decentralize land 
administration. Advances in information technology and remote sensing have revolutionized the way in 
which land is administered in other regions and reduced the cost of doing so, providing tools for 
implementation that were not available earlier. Second, increased prices for food, fuel, and fiber are 
capitalized in land values and, together with emerging demand for land by investors, add to pre-existing 
pressures on land via urban expansion all over Africa. Clearly defined property rights (at the individual or 
group level) and a well-governed system of land administration will be essential to avoid that these lead 
to socially undesirable outcomes and conflicts.  
Yet, although the importance of formalizing property rights has also been emphasized by other scholars 
(de Soto 2000), surprisingly little seems to have happened on the ground. Progress with implementation 
of new laws has often been slowed by institutional wrangles. The lack of experience led even respected 
scholars to view interventions to register land as paradigmatic examples of a long discredited top-down 
approach to development rather than ways to empower land users (Easterly 2008). Although it is 
recognized that the ‘title-no title’ dichotomy may be ‘the wrong answer to the wrong question’ (Bromley 
2008), it tends to continue in the empirical debate in the literature.  
Against this backdrop, this paper aims to quantify the economic impacts of recent land certification in 
Ethiopia, arguably the largest land administration program carried out over the last decade in Africa, and 
possibly the world. The program departs from traditional titling interventions in a number of ways, in 
particular by (i) issuing non-alienable use right certificates rather than full titles; (ii) aiming to promote 
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using a participatory and highly decentralized process of field adjudication; and (iv) constraining needs 
for spatial information to a minimum to reduce costs. This could potentially provide a basis for a rapid 
and large-scale approach to avoid the shortcomings that reduced the sustainability and poverty impact of 
past land registration programs and help provide a response to the emerging challenges.  
To assess whether Ethiopia’s experience holds lessons for others, we assess the impact of the program as 
implemented in the Amhara region on perceived tenure security, land-related investment, and land market 
participation. Limited capacity at the woreda level led to a phase-in of the program that, together with a 
four-round panel household survey, allows us to implement a difference-in-difference strategy to identify 
early program impacts. Evidence points not only towards significant positive program effects on the 
outcomes of interest but also a very positive benefit-cost ratio. A number of steps to ensure sustainability 
of benefits or to increase them are suggested and study of differentiated impacts, as well as channels 
through which they materialize, will be desirable. At the same time, there are clear lessons that could help 
other countries in confronting some of the secular challenges they face in the area of land policy and 
administration.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews evidence on impacts of land-related programs as 
well as characteristics of the Ethiopian effort that are used to formulate hypotheses on program impact. 
Section three presents descriptive data for the entire sample and for treatment and control groups and 
discusses the modalities of program implementation and their implications for the estimation strategy. 
Section four provides estimates of certification impacts on the key variables of interest and section five 
concludes with a number of implications for Ethiopia and other countries in the region.  
2. Background and approach  
To set the stage, we discuss how and why measures to strengthen land rights or improve the way in which 
they can be enforced will affect owners’ incentives to make land-related investment, transfer land to more 
efficient uses through market transactions, and use it as collateral for credit. These predictions are 
contrasted with empirical evidence from different settings, especially in Africa. Key characteristics of the 
program and policy environment in Ethiopia are then used to review expected impacts, identify proxies to 
measure them empirically, and formulate hypotheses that can be subjected to statistical tests.  
2.1 Evidence from the literature and implications for Africa  
The literature identifies three channels through which higher security and better enforcement of property 
rights can, in principle, affect economic outcomes. First, clearly defined property rights to land and the 
ability to draw on the state’s enforcement capacity will reduce the risk of eviction, increase incentives for 
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out or defend their claims. The latter can be of particular importance for groups, e.g., women, whose 
access to land was traditionally discriminated against (Joireman 2008).  
Positive impacts of more secure land tenure on investment and land values in rural areas have been 
demonstrated in China (Jacoby et al. 2002), Thailand (Feder et al. 1988), Latin America (Deininger and 
Chamorro 2004, Field et al. 2006, Bandiera 2007, Fort 2007), Eastern Europe (Rozelle and Swinnen 
2004), and Africa (Deininger and Jin 2006, Goldstein and Udry 2006). In urban areas, efforts to enhance 
tenure security have led to higher levels of self-assessed land values (Lanjouw and Levy 2002), increased 
investment in housing (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2005) and female empowerment (Field 2005). Receipt 
of titles allowed former squatters, especially females, to join formal labor markets instead of staying at 
home to guard their land, thereby increasing their income and reducing child labor (Field 2007). Joint 
titles helped reduce fertility (Field 2003), increased investment in children’s human capital (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2004) and improved educational outcomes (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2005). The way in 
which property rights to land could be exercised affected governance and corruption (Lobo and 
Balakrishnan 2002) and performance of local institutions (Deininger and Jin 2008).  
The size of tenure-security and investment effects will depend on the attractiveness of investment 
opportunities and the reduction in enforcement efforts, i.e., it will be larger where tenure has been very 
insecure or the level of conflict high. A key policy issue, especially in Africa, is not only whether 
expected benefits are large enough to justify the cost but also whether a process can be implemented in an 
equitable manner and the institutions required can be sustained over time. Emphasis on individual title has 
often been associated with a failure to recognize the wide spectrum of joint and communal rights as well 
as local institutions that may have had more effective local presence than a distant state. As a result, 
efforts to improve tenure security may have weakened or extinguished some rights, displaced institutions 
without providing alternatives, and in doing so disempowered certain groups and increased rather than 
reduced conflict. Adoption of a sporadic rather than systematic approach and lack of safeguards such as 
wide dissemination of information and a transparent and public adjudication process with possibility for 
appeal have often set off a speculative clamor for land which, if not checked, may have led to 
interventions reinforcing or exacerbating pre-existing inequalities, with little positive impact on growth. 
Finally, failure to ensure that the cost of first-time registration as well as updating of registry records, in 
relation to land values, is commensurate the benefits, has often made it difficult to either complete first 
registration or keep the registry up to date. A combination of these issues has limited the effectiveness of 
or benefits from efforts at land registration in many African contexts (Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994, Bruce 
  3and Migot-Adholla 1994, Jacoby and Minten 2007) and it will be important to check whether the case at 
hand was able to address some of these.  
Being able to access reliable information on individuals’ land ownership at low-cost through a public 
registry will also reduce the cost of exchanging land in markets for rental or sales. Rental allows land 
owners to tap new sources of income while still maintaining land as a means of insurance or old-age 
protection while those who remain in farming can consolidate and cultivate larger areas. Having a 
certificate can allay fears that land that has been rented can be lost, either to the government through 
redistribution, or to the tenant who will not vacate it upon termination of the lease period. This could be 
useful in contexts where migration will require land owners to be temporarily absent or if the number of 
transactions increases beyond the level that can be handled by informal mechanisms at the local level in a 
transparent way. In China, rental contributed to occupational diversification and was estimated to have 
increased productivity by about 60% (Deininger and Jin 2008). In Vietnam, award of certificates is 
estimated to not only have prompted investment in perennials (by 7.5% compared to no certificates) but 
also an 11-12 week expansion of the time households spent in non-agricultural activity, an effect that was 
particularly pronounced for the poor (Do and Iyer 2008). 
Key benefits from possession of formal land title for land sales are the ability to exchange land with 
strangers and the associated ability to use land as collateral for credit (de Soto 2000).
1 The reason is that, 
if a reliable land registry provides a formal and low-cost way to identify land ownership without the need 
of physical inspection or inquiry with neighbors, land is ideal as collateral. At the same time, for credit 
effects from formal registration to materialize, households will need to have otherwise bankable projects, 
be credit-worthy, and willing to take the associated risk (Boucher et al. 2008). Moreover, land markets 
need to be sufficiently liquid to make a sale feasible within a given time if needed, implying that land 
rights are fully transferable and neither legal provisions nor social conventions limit foreclosure. While 
credit effects of land titling are reported in the literature (Feder et al. 1988), positive impacts were often 
limited to larger land owners (Mushinski 1999, Carter and Olinto 2003) and studies fail to find credit 
effects even in settings where such an effect was expected (Field et al. 2006, Fort 2007). Even if 
profitable projects exist, legal restrictions on land sales (Sundet 2004), limited commercial value of the 
land under question (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2005, Payne et al. 2008) and social or political 
considerations to limit foreclosure (Field and Torero 2006) may jeopardize realization of credit effects 
and imply that such effects may be less readily realized than sometimes suggested by their protagonists.  
                                                 
1 The large differences in the ratio of credit to GDP across countries is used as a key argument to justify interventions to formalize land rights that 
could then allow greater use of land as a collateral to access credit (de Soto 2000, Besley and Ghatak 2008). 
  42.2 Hypotheses on program impact and outcome variables 
The extent to which any of the above effects of land certification materialize will depend on the policy 
environment, modalities of program implementation, and owners’ confidence that certificates will be 
respected and change behavior. Before formulating hypotheses, we discuss these three elements in turn.  
Three factors contributed to low levels of tenure security in Ethiopia (Amhara) and thus considerable 
potential for certification. First, in 1997, Amhara implemented, a redistribution of land that was largely 
politically motivated and generated considerable conflict (Ege 1997) that may be addressed in the context 
of land certification. Moreover, land in Ethiopia remains state owned and the constitution affirms the right 
of every adult to access land while empowering government to resort to land redistribution to achieve this 
goal, with high levels of bureaucratic discretion, if necessary.
2 Discussion of this topic has recently 
intensified as Tigray region passed and started implementing a proclamation to take away land of rural 
residents who had left their village for more than two years. Finally, urban expansion as well as award of 
land to investors by the government is proceeding apace and in both cases possession of a certificate can 
provide at least a basis for demanding and determining levels of compensation. Also, as land in Ethiopia 
is state property that can neither be sold nor mortgaged, we would expect no credit effects from land 
certification. Moreover, with the exception of Amhara, all regions restrict the amount of land that can be 
leased out to 50% of any holding, suggesting that—beyond Amhara—certification impacts on land rental 
markets may be limited.  
The literature has many examples where differential access to information in the course of implementing 
land registration programs led such interventions to exacerbate rather than reduce pre-existing biases by 
wealth or gender. In Ethiopia, the tendency of land certification to encourage encroachment on communal 
lands by the powerful was particularly important. The only way to reduce this tendency was to identify 
such lands before any individual plots were demarcated in a public and participatory process (Gebre and 
Keneaa 2008). Both a process that is perceived to be unjust and failure to honor certificates on the part of 
officials can undermine the credibility of the whole process and thus any impact which one would expect 
certificates to have. Indeed, case studies report great skepticism among farmers who initially believed that 
certification was just another politically motivated campaign and only started changing their view as they 
participated in the process and realized the potential usefulness of the certificates (Adal 2008).  
While qualitative evidence on process characteristics can provide a first assessment of economic impacts 
from certification, our quantitative outcome variables focus on three areas, namely perceived tenure 
                                                 
2 The proclamation (law) in Amhara provides for land redistribution but makes it the responsibility of local communities and requires that it be 
supported by research to eliminate potentially adverse effects on land fragmentation and productivity. Tigray has recently started redistributing 
the land of anybody who had been absent from the village for more than 2 years and earned more than a certain amount (US $ 100 per month).  
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before the program, and the fact that certification would be expected to affect this variable quickly, imply 
that the perceived level of land tenure security is a useful indicator. We use the response to the question of 
whether the household expects a change (increase or decrease) of land holdings through administrative 
action over the next 5 years and note that, as the question format was identical in all the four survey 
rounds, concerns about potential halo effects are unfounded. Second, theory suggests that higher levels of 
tenure security will lead to higher levels of voluntary land-related investment, possibly with some lag. We 
use a dummy for whether households constructed new soil conservation structures (e.g., terraces, bunds 
made of soil or rocks, and hedgerows) or repaired existing ones at the plot level, as well as the number of 
hours spent on this, to measure such investment. Unfortunately, this variable is only available for the last 
two survey rounds. Finally, at least in the case of Amhara, possession of a certificate should make it 
easier to rent out land but, except for general equilibrium effects at the village level, not affect the extent 
of renting in and we use a dummy for the type or net rental market participation and the amount of land 
transacted through such markets as the relevant indicator to ascertain impacts of land certification on 
participation, noting that other impacts, e.g., those on allocative efficiency and overall productivity, 
transcend the scope of this paper and should be the subject of separate investigation.  
2.3 Program characteristics and qualitative evidence on impact 
In what is one of the largest programs of land registration in the world, three of Ethiopia’s four main 
regions have, over the last 5 years, registered more than 20 million parcels of rural land by some 6 million 
households.
3 Despite the rapid speed, the quality of the certification process—measured by the share of 
cases where conflict could not re resolved, thus precluding issuance of a certificate—was high; 
certificates could not be issued in only 5% of cases, compared to 20% in other titling projects. Moreover, 
at less than US $ 1 per parcel (Deininger et al. 2008b), the cost of Ethiopia’s certification program is an 
order of magnitude lower than what is reported in the literature which puts the cost of traditional titling at 
between US $ 20 and 60 per parcel (Burns 2007). In fact, even low-tech  approaches that issue only 
certificates in West Africa are estimated to have cost some US$ 7-10 per parcel (Lavigne-Delville 2006). 
Under the general process that was adhered to with some regional variations certification is initiated by a 
team of experts from the woreda level that accompanies the process through a village meeting,
 followed 
by election of an independent village land use and administration committee (LAC),
4 which then assumes 
                                                 
3 Tigray had implemented a similar program in 1998. The size of the program is similar to 11 million of certificates awarded in Vietnam from 
1993 to 2000 and issuance of 8.7 million titles in Thailand during 1980-2005. It also compares favourably to accomplishments by other land 
administration programs such as the 2.7 million titles (1.2 million urban and 1.5 million rural) issued in Peru from 1992 to 2005 and 1.8 million 
titles in Indonesia since 1996. 
4 The fact that the LAC is directly elected in a democratic fashion rather than being part of the (often politicized) administrative structure was 
highlighted repeatedly as an important merit in interviews with groups as well as individual villagers.  
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neighbors. While LAC members repeatedly emphasized the demanding nature of this task, it is critical to 
ensure transparency, e.g., in identification of communal areas, and reduces the scope for error that could 
arise from use office records that may not be up to date. The field adjudication process, which may rely 
on assistance by elders to resolve conflicts, concludes with the issuance of a preliminary registration 
certificate that identifies sizes and the adjoining neighbors for all of a holder’s plots. Results are then 
displayed in public, followed by their entry into registry books, copies of which are to be kept at kebele 
and woreda level. Thereafter, certificates with holders’ pictures (husband and spouse in case of couples 
where joint ownership is mandated), are issued. While these include space for maps, spatial information is 
not included except in pilot locations in view of the cost and is expected to be added in a ‘second stage’.  
Qualitative evidence suggests that decentralized, participatory, and transparent implementation, issuance 
of certificates rather than titles, and a focus on gender equality, helped the program avoid some of the 
problems raised in the literature on land titling in Africa. A nation-wide survey highlights that access to 
information or certificates was neither biased against females nor the poor. Moreover, the process was 
generally implemented as planned; in particular (i) public meetings were held before and during the 
certification process; (ii) land use committees (LACs) were elected and represented most of the sub-
kebeles; and (iii) adjudication relied on village elders to resolve disputes and involved demarcation in the 
field with neighbors’ presence. As the time allowed for the field process was long enough to sort out 
conflicts locally, the program could adapt to local conditions while still making rapid overall progress.  
An overwhelming majority of households nation-wide pointed to positive impacts of certification on 
gender relations, land-related investment, rental market participation, and the perceived ability to receive 
compensation in case of land taking. More than 80% were willing to pay for replacement of lost 
certificates as well as addition of a map (Deininger et al. 2008b). Case study evidence points into a 
similar direction; as registration involved identification of borders and systematic conflict resolution, it 
led to a significant drop in land conflict which, according to local government reports, accounts for 80% 
of rural crime. In one site, the volume of court cases is reported to have reduced from 20 to at most 2 per 
week (Adal 2008). In some cases, widows were able to win court cases to hold on to their land rather 
than, as dictated by local tradition, having it revert back to the husband’s lineage at the point of his death. 
In polygamous settings, the requirement to have separate certificates for any spouses beyond the first one 
is linked to a reduction in (reported) polygamy and even male farmers acknowledge that joint titling led to 
increased willingness to work and invest on the part of their wives who are now officially co-owners. 
Households in areas where urban expansion is imminent are reported to be particularly eager to get 
certificates that could help them substantiate their claims for compensation once their land is subject to 
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emergence of innovative in-kind compensation arrangements in a number of peri-urban areas.  
3. Data, descriptive evidence, and econometric approach 
This section describes the data underlying our empirical evidence and the sequence in which the program 
was implemented in treatment and control villages as a basis for tracking key indicators for hypothesized 
program impacts. This provides a pipeline comparison group that allows us to apply a difference-in-
difference method to estimate the impact of land certification on the outcome variables of interest.  
3.1 Data sources and modalities of program implementation  
To test the above hypotheses, we use data from four waves of a panel survey of rural households that 
were conducted in 1999, 2001, 2004, and 2007 in East Gojjam zone of Amhara region in a number of 
villages all of which were supported by a SIDA-supported rural development project.
5 In each round, the 
survey, which was undertaken by the Department of Economics of Addis Ababa University in 
collaboration with Gothenburg University, EDRI, and the World Bank, includes information on some 900 
randomly selected households and more than 4,000 plots operated by them.
6 The fact that the first 3 
waves of the panel cover the period before certification started whereas some of the villages had been 
certified at the time of the 4
th round allows us to use a difference-in-difference strategy together with a 
pipeline implementation strategy. This is possible as in some villages certification had been completed 12 
months or more before implementation of the 4
th round of our survey, thus affecting investment and land 
market participation decisions. As other project components were available in all villages, there is little 
concern about time-varying factors affecting villages differently and thus biasing our estimates. This is 
supported by the fact that, before the program, outcome variables moved in parallel in the villages.  
Our strategy is conservative in two ways. First, as at the time of the 4
th round of our survey all the villages 
had received information about the certification program, households in villages which we classify as 
‘non-certified’ (some of whom had already received a certificate at the time the survey was implemented) 
may well have adjusted their behavior in anticipation of future program availability, implying that 
estimates of program impacts obtained here will be a lower bound of the true effect. Second, as we define 
the intervention at the village rather than the household level, our ‘treated’ category includes households 
who, for a number of reasons (mainly conflict that could not be resolved or delays in the issuance of 
                                                 
5 The Gojjam zone was selected purposefully to represent surplus producing areas of the region. The districts and the villages in each district were 
also selected based on similar criteria while households in each village were selected randomly.  
6 Information for one of the sampled villages is available only for the last two rounds, as it was included in the sample during the third round. For 
production information, the reference period was the main agricultural season (meher, i.e., from June-February) of 1998/99, 2000/01, 2003/04 
and 2006/07 agricultural years. 
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downward bias on the estimated effects of certification under reasonable assumptions.  
Table 1 illustrates patterns of program implementation for the 7 villages (kebeles) in 3 districts (woredas) 
in our survey. First, we note a distinct phasing of program implementation which was undertaken by the 
woreda administration based on their discretion. With the exception of one control village (Telma), the 
program was introduced between February 2003 and February 2004 in our treatment villages, compared 
to the May 2005 to Sept. 2006 period in control ones. It then took an average of 11 months to complete 
registration and another 5 months for certificates to be issued. By comparison, 3 of the control villages 
had completed registration and two had started issuance of certificates at the time of the survey. In control 
villages that started certification, the process commenced some 15 months later than the treated ones and 
the delay in program introduction provides an identification strategy for our empirical analysis. Apart 
from the later start, the process implemented was identical as illustrated by the number of LAC members 
and village meetings which do not point to significant differences between the two groups of villages.  
Household level evidence on process characteristics in the top panel of table 2 reinforces this; 85% in 
certified and 78% in control villages attended an average of 3.5 public information meetings and 85% and 
68%, respectively, think they are well informed about the program. At the time of the survey, 87% of 
households in treatment villages had received a certificate, which they held for an average of 17 months, 
compared to 36% and 8 months in controls, with 77.5% in treatment and 2.3% in control areas having 
held certificates for a period longer than 12 months. Plot level data in the bottom panel of table 2 point 
towards some difference in implementation across villages; while almost all the plots (92%) in treated 
villages were measured (95% with rope) in the field with presence of more than half of neighbors in 60% 
of cases and between one third and half in 20% of cases, field measurement was done for less than two 
thirds of registered plots in control villages, 35% of these cases involved eye estimation only, and more 
than half or more than one third of neighbors were present only in 35% and 11% of cases.  
To illustrate the evolution of key dependent variables, table 3 displays key household characteristics by 
participation status and year for the 356 and 477 households in treated and control villages, respectively. 
While there are few differences in heads’ age or sex, systematic differences at the household level point 
towards the importance of controlling for household heterogeneity. For example, the treated villages have 
somewhat higher endowments of land per household (but not per capita), higher levels of human capital 
as proxied by literacy of the head, more livestock and other animals, and use higher amounts of fertilizer 
per hectare. Although the villages are some distance from each other, some time-varying factors (e.g., a 
drought in 2002) appear to have affected both of them in similar ways. Attributes for the 3,972 and 4,699 
plots in treated and untreated villages, averaged over all periods, as reported in table 4, suggest that the 
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years. With 4%, irrigation is very rare in both villages and even though there are small differences in the 
subjective land attributes (land quality and incline), there are no statistically significant differences 
between villages in the share of flat and gently sloped as well as good and medium quality land together.  
3.2 Outcome variables  
Levels and changes over time in the outcome variables of interest, as displayed in table 5, provide a first 
check of our hypotheses. First, we note that in both treated and control villages perceptions of tenure 
insecurity in 1999 were indeed very high, with three fourths or more of land holders (78% in treated and 
75% in control areas) expecting a change of land holdings due to administrative intervention, possibly as 
the 1997 redistribution was still fresh on their minds. Over the next 5 years, i.e., in the period before the 
certification program, these shares declined to 38% in both treatment and control villages. Between 2004 
and 2007, i.e., during the period of program implementation, the trends diverge with a drop to 24% in 
treated areas that contrasts to a slight increase to 39% in control villages. Disaggregation reveals that the 
share expecting an increase dropped from 19% to 4% in treatment and to 11% in control areas, whereas 
the share of those expecting a decrease in their holdings remained unchanged in treatment areas while 
increasing from 19% to 28% in controls. As the generalized expectation of an increase in holding size 
could exert considerable pressure on policy-makers, both of these may be of relevance for tenure security. 
While less robust, a plot-level variable asking land owners whether they were concerned about land 
conflict, albeit introduced only in the last round, also points to significantly higher levels of tenure 
insecurity in the control (20%) as compared to the treatment group (14%) in a simple cross section.  
Although the pre-program share of plots where investment or repairs were undertaken and the level of 
time spent on such investment were significantly higher in control as compared to treated villages, the 
difference in both narrowed significantly, and for construction of new structures even reversed, consistent 
with the hypothesis that certification did affect investment incentives in the expected direction. For 
example, a significant decline in the share of households who voluntarily engaged in construction of new 
or repair of existing structures and the number of hours spent (from 36% to 24% and 8.2 to 5.5 hours, 
respectively) in control areas contrasts with an equally large increase (from 12% to 25% and 2.3 to 4.4 
hours) of this figure in treated ones. Similar narrowing or reversal is observed for the share of plots with 
any type of conservation structure (from 44% to 34% in control and from 22% to 32% in treatment areas) 
and the share of households who constructed new structures during the last 12 months (from 10% to 8% 
and 7% to 10% in control and treatment villages, respectively). 
The share of landlords and mean area rented out had been consistently higher in treated as compared to 
control villages before land use certificates were distributed, a difference that narrowed from 2004. After 
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renting out (7% vs. 5%) is marginally higher in treated as compared to control group, the opposite is true 
for renting in, implying that more rigorous evidence will be needed to assess whether certification can be 
said to have had a significant impact on land market participation or whether, possibly as a result of the 
rather restrictive policy regime, no such impact materialized.  
3.3 Econometric approach 
To econometrically identify possible impacts of the certification program, we apply a difference-in-
difference approach that compares the difference between pre- and post-program household and plot level 
outcome variables in certified and non-certified villages. This will provide us with an unbiased estimate 
of program effects if unobserved differences between treatment and control villages do not affect changes 
in outcome variables over time. This seems reasonable given that treated and control villages are located 
in the same zone, were exposed to the same set of interventions under a SIDA-financed rural development 
program, but entered the certification program at different points in time as a result of capacity limitations 
at the woreda level that implied a need for sequencing program start-up. The fact that other characteristics 
as well as outcome variables before the program evolved in a similar fashion on both sets of villages adds 
credence to this.  
To estimate program impacts on perceived tenure security, we use data from all four rounds to estimate  
  , it i it it t it u c w y + + + + = γ x τ λ  (1) 
where   is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if household i expects an increase (or a decrease) 
of its landholdings due to administrative intervention in the five years following the survey; wit is the 
policy variable of interest (1 for post-treatment period if household i resides in ‘treated’ village and 0 
otherwise);  is a vector of household controls that include the head’s age, gender, education, assets 
(number of oxen, value of other livestock, roof material) and relative land size, defined as the amount of 
owned land per adult equivalent relative to the median of this variable in the village;   captures 




t λ  is a full set of time dummies; and   is an iid error term. The 
null hypothesis that certification increases tenure security would imply that 
it u
τ  be negative and significant. 
Random effects probit model is appropriate if   is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance   
and independent from all right-hand side variables. As this may be unrealistic, we also use Chamberlain’s 
random effects probit (Chamberlain 1980, Wooldridge 2001) which relaxes this by allowing correlation 
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where 
i x  is the vector of average of time-varying household covariates for household i over all periods 
and ai is an error term. All that is required is that   and   are independently and normally distributed 
with mean zero and variance  . Adding 
it x i a
2
a σ
i x  as an explanatory variables to (1) in each time period then 
allows estimation of the parameters λ , τ , γ , ψ , ξ  and   in a standard random effects probit model.  
2
a σ
In contras to the household-level analysis in (1), impacts of certification on land-related investment are 
assessed at the plot level. Dependent variables for land-related investment take the value of 1 if the plot 
received soil or water conservation investment during the past 12 months or the number of hours spent in 
undertaking such investment during the past 12 months. Using the notation introduced above, the random 
effects probit or tobit (depending on the choice of the dependent variable) model for land-related 
investment on plot j by household i is specified as: 
  , jit i i jit it it t jit u a w ψ y + + + + + + + = ξ δ x p x γ τ λ  (2) 
where the only difference is the inclusion of  , a vector of plot level characteristics that includes size, 
soil quality, slope, and length of possession, and the addition of a plot specific error term  . The 
hypothesis of certification increasing incentives for land-related investment translates into 
jit p
jit u
τ  > 0. As 
earlier rounds did not include comparable information, our analysis is limited to the last two rounds 
Similar random effects probit and tobit specifications for participation on either side of the market and the 
amount of land transferred, respectively, are estimated for our rental market outcomes. As, for example 
due to non-convex transaction costs, rental market participation may be persistent over time (Holden et al. 
2008), we also estimate a specification that allows for state dependence of rental market participation. 
The implied need to include the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of (1) gives rise to a 
nonlinear dynamic model that may suffer from the initial condition problem, i.e., the correlation between 
the unobserved effect and the initial observation of the dependent variable. To account for this, the 
distribution of the unobserved effect is modeled conditional on the initial observation in addition to the 
time-varying household level covariates (Wooldridge 2005). The reduced form equation to be estimated is 
  , 0 0 1 , it i i i t i it it t it u a y y w ψ y + + + + + + + + = − ξ x x ξ ρ τ λ γ  (3) 
where   is the lagged dependent variable and   is the first realization of the dependent variable. The 
parameters in equation (
1 − it y 0 i y
3) are estimated using standard random effects probit or tobit, depending on the 
  12type of the dependent variable. As this procedure requires data for at least for four periods, we are forced 
to drop one of the villages (A. Gulit) that was added to the survey during the third round. The hypothesis 
of a positive impact of certification on the propensity to rent out land translates into   in the probit 
and tobit equations for renting out or the area rented out.  
0 > τ
4. Key results 
Results corresponding to the three main hypotheses suggest that, despite the limited time elapsed since its 
completion, certification had a positive economic impact and improved tenure security, investment, and 
supply of land to the rental market. Even conservative estimates and a very rough calculation of monetary 
benefits point towards a positive and large cost-benefit ratio.  
4.1 Tenure security  
Results from probit estimation of (1) to identify determinants of higher perceived risk of land loss or gain 
through administrative redistribution in the next 5 years are reported in table 6 for the simple (col. 1 and 
3) and Chamberlain specification (col. 2 and 4). In all cases, results suggest that households in treated 
villages have higher levels of tenure security, i.e., expect significantly less administrative intervention. 
Marginal effects suggest that, consistent across the two specifications, certification leads to a decrease of 
about 14 percentage points in the share of those expecting to gain and of about 9 percentage points in the 
share of those expecting to lose from land redistribution. Certification did not eliminate fears of land 
redistribution but helped to reduce it from levels that were very high even by global standards.  
Coefficients on the time trend are highly significant and of large magnitude for gains but less significant 
for land losses, in line with descriptive evidence that points towards a reduction over time in the share of 
those who expect their holdings to increase rather than those who expect to lose land. Signs for 
coefficients on other variables are largely as expected. Older heads are more likely to expect land loss, 
consistent with the notion that administrative measure aim to redistribute productive assets among 
generations. A higher per capita land endowment, relative to the village median, increases the perceived 
likelihood of land loss and reduces the likelihood of gain, as expected in a system that aims to distribute a 
limited amount of overall land as equitably as possible among rural residents. The opposite is true for 
higher shares of good quality land, something that could suggest that officials are either not good at 
assessing land quality or do not take it into account in making their decisions. Higher endowments with 
non-land assets, oxen, education, or possession of an iron roof have—with the possible exception of the 
latter—little impact on the perceived threat of land loss or gain, suggesting that officials’ objective is 
neither a general redistribution of assets nor a maximization of productivity (e.g., a desire to substitute for 
land markets in bringing land to better endowed households). The significance of coefficients on gender-
  13related variables such as the sex of the head and the number of adult males in the simple specification 
disappears once the Chamberlain method is used, suggesting that once we control for households’ history 
these variables no longer affect tenure security. Interactions between the treatment dummy and variables 
such as the amount of land owned, total assets, and head’s gender are consistently insignificant. While 
this may be a result of the limited number of observations, it provides little support to the notion of 
certification-induced tenure security effects being differentiated by wealth or gender.  
4.2 Land-related investment  
Table 7 reports coefficient estimates, as marginal effects, from probit and tobit models for new 
investment in or repairs of conservation structures during the last 12 months for the simple (col. 1, 2, 4 
and 5) and Chamberlain specifications (col. 3 and 6). Results consistently point towards a statistically 
significant and economically meaningful certification impact with an estimated average treatment effect 
of some 30 percentage points on the propensity to invest in soil and water conservation measures and 
more than a doubling of the number of hours spent on such activities. Although from a low base and 
consistent with case study evidence, this is a large impact compared to other studies in the literature. 
Given that certification was only concluded recently, such investment will not have affected agricultural 
production as reported in our survey. To obtain a proximate measure of the size of the investment impact, 
we estimate a household-fixed effect production function with a dummy for presence of a functioning 
conservation structure (see appendix table 1 for results). Results suggest that such a structure increases 
output by about 9 percentage points, implying that, with a mean annual output of B 3,300, the investment-
induced certification impact would amount to B 87 per hectare (0.29*0.09*3,330). Even if we assume that 
half of the investment actually involves repairs of existing structures and discount at 10%, our 
conservative estimate implies that the increment in output resulting from certification-induced investment 
in the first year post certification alone would be sufficient to entirely cover program cost (US$ 1 per plot 
or US$ 3.2 per hectare).  
Coefficients on other variables suggest that the propensity to make land-related investment increases in 
plot size but decreases in overall holding size, consistent with the notion that presence of some fixed cost 
element increases payoffs from investment on larger fields but that, on larger holdings, there is increased 
competition among plots for investment. It also declines with time and gender the head but increases 
marginally with the number of dependents in the Chamberlain specification. The propensity to undertake 
investment is significantly lower on flat land, consistent with the fact that such plots are less prone to be 
affected by erosion and land degradation than hilly plots, implying less need to guard against these 
through adoption of soil conservation measures. As the investments considered do not involve any cash 
outlays, there is little reason to expect impacts to be differentiated by wealth, as indeed suggested 
  14consistent lack of significance of the certification dummy’s interaction of the with various measures of 
wealth (not reported) is insignificant throughout.  
4.3 Rental market participation  
To test whether, as predicted, certification affected the propensity to rent out but left the demand-side of 
the market unaffected, tables 8 and 9 present results from probit and tobit estimates of equation (3). In 
both cases, cols. 1-3 which contain, respectively the simple and the Chamberlain specification without 
dynamic effects, strongly support our hypothesis. While the treatment variable is weakly significant in the 
simple specification, the dynamic (col. 3 and 6 of both tables) suggest strong positive state dependence of 
participation decisions and the amount of land transacted on both sides of the rental market. Such path 
dependence implies that policy interventions that affect rental market participation will have effects on 
households’ trajectories in the long term. Estimated marginal effects suggest that certification increases 
the propensity to rent out by 13 percentage points and the magnitude of land rented out by about 9 points 
or 1/10 of a hectare for the average farm in the sample. Estimated impacts for renting in are consistently 
insignificant. Socio-cultural norms and factor market imperfections make self-cultivation by female heads 
extremely rare, implying that they can either rent out their land or—often because of insecure tenure—
leave it fallow (Adal 2005). To the extent that they allow productive use of plots that had been left 
uncultivated, certification-induced rental market effects would enhance productivity as well as equity. 
Higher levels of tenure security could affect productivity in a number of ways, e.g., by allowing landlords 
to enter longer term contracts or select more productive tenants who are not part of their immediate social 
network. As virtually all of the land is rented under sharecropping contracts, any such effects would 
translate directly into improved welfare for female landlords. Although beyond the scope of this paper, 
further study of this issue and of  non-economic impacts, e.g.,  female empowerment, would be of 
interest.  
Our results also point towards a significant impact of land endowments on renting out (positive) and 
renting in (negative) as would be expected if rental markets contribute to equalization of factor input 
ratios. Total owned area has a positive and significant effect in the leasing out regressions as compared to 
a negative and significant effect on the leasing in regressions. However, the absolute value of the 
marginal effect of total owned land on the amount of land rented out or in (table 9) is less than one, 
indicating that rental market participation allows only partial adjustment towards desired area of 
cultivated land (Bliss and Stern 1982). We note that, contrary to what is found in studies from other 
countries, but consistent with other evidence from Ethiopia (Deininger et al. 2008a), rental markets 
transfer land from relatively resource poor (mainly in terms of oxen power) who are often female-headed, 
to comparatively resource rich households. Consistent with the notion that imperfect labor markets, 
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that this effect is exacerbated by ill-functioning markets for draught animals, the gender of the household 
head and the number of oxen have a significant impact on the nature and magnitude of rental market 
transactions and that estimated to have very large and significant effects (which is smaller in the 
Chamberlain specification) that discourage renting out but encourage renting in. The significant 
coefficient on possession of an iron roof in the rent-in equation reinforces this notion, suggesting that 
there may also be imperfections in other financial markets that make renting in easier for those with 
higher levels of wealth. To the extent that the certification-induced higher propensity to rent out implies 
greater freedom in the choice of transaction partner, certification could, by allowing women to choose 
more able partners, have an impact not only on the productivity of rental transactions and land use in 
general but also on the welfare of a vulnerable group, something left for future research. At the same 
time, older households are more likely to rent out and literate ones rent our larger areas of land.  
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper aimed to explore whether the land certification program in Amhara had positive economic 
impacts and could provide lessons for others. Despite its recent nature and clear gaps in the local policy 
environment, we find evidence of significant economic benefits, the magnitude of which exceeds program 
cost significantly. Follow-up research to assess non-economic effects from the program, especially on 
female empowerment, the channels through which specific program effects materialize, the path of their 
evolution over time, and how benefits are distributed across the population, would be of great interest. 
More immediately, our results give rise to a number of conclusions.  
For Ethiopia, the evidence of clear benefits implies that completion of certification will be warranted, 
ideally based on review and possible adjustment with regard to institutional structure (EPLAUA vs. 
MOARD), specific rules for implementation (communal areas, women’s participation, spatial records), 
and the policy framework (leasing). Second, while tenure security and investment benefits can further 
increase over time, especially as other factors that are needed for such effects to materialize (e.g., non-
agricultural employment opportunities or better marketing channels) come into place, they can easily be 
undermined if beneficiaries’ lose confidence in the value of certificates. Taking of land by government—
whether for urban expansion, outside investors, or internal redistribution—without use of certificates to 
determine compensation levels or prompt award of compensation could jeopardize credibility of 
certificates. At a more technical level, failure to keep them up to date, e.g., because of deficiencies in 
record-keeping, would have the same effect and could result in them losing their value.  
The evidence presented here suggests not only that implementation of a decentralized, transparent, and 
cost-effective process of land registration is possible, but also that failure to do so may in many situations 
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forgo significant economic and possibly social benefits. Assessment of impacts of similar programs in 
other contexts would not only be highly desirable and could provide a fruitful avenue for research that 
considers land titling as one of many avenues to secure and gradually formalize land rights.  Table 1: Program characteristics by village 
  Certificates issued 12 months before survey?  
 No    Yes 
District (Woreda) name  Gozamin   Enemay  Machakel   Gozamin  
Village (Kebele) name  Kebi  Wolkie  Telma  S. Debir  Amanuel  D. Elias  A. Gulit 
Kebele area in ha  630  2670  1964  2560  4373  1790  2172 
No of households  1094  1050  1464  1275  1151  906  890 
Program introduced   May 2005  Sep. 2006  Oct. 2003  Jun. 2005  Feb. 2004  Feb. 2004  Feb. 2003 
Competed registration   Dec. 2005  NC  Aug. 2006  Dec. 2006  Jun. 2004  Jul. 2004  May 2005 
Start of certificate distribution   Aug. 2006  NS  Sep. 2006  NS  Feb. 2005  Feb. 2005  Jun. 2005 
No. of LAC members  15  20  21  35  14  14  18 
Training days to LAC members  3  5  8  8  9  4  6 
Number of village meetings  4  4  6  2  5  3  3 
Source: Own computation from AAU/Gothenburg/WB Survey 
NC=Not completed at the time of the survey. NS=Not started at the time of the survey. 
18 Table 2: Program characteristics at household and plot levels 
  Certificates issued? 
  No Yes 
Household level data 
A member of the household attended public information meetings   0.78  0.85 
Number of meetings attended  3.50  3.60 
Well informed about the program  0.68  0.85 
Has landholding certificate  35.55  87.47 
Number of months since certified  8.07  17.15 
Plot level data 
Plot area was determined in the field  0.64  0.92 
Plot area was determined at kebele office referring to previous records  0.35  0.05 
Plot measured using tape and rope, if determined in the field  0.65  0.95 
Plot measured using eye estimation, if determined in the field  0.35  0.00 
More than half of the neighbors were present when measured  0.35  0.59 
Half or less than half of the neighbors were present were present   0.11  0.20 
Plot has a certificate  0.30  0.75 
Number of months since certified  8.19  16.93 
Plot is jointly certified with head and spouse  0.83  0.77 
Number of households  481  359 
Number of plots  2369  2143 
Source: Own computation from AAU/Gothenburg/WB Survey 
 
19 Table 3: Household characteristics by treatment category over time 
  No certificate  With certificate 
  1999 2002 2004 2007 1999 2002 2004 2007 
Total owned land in hectares   1.34 1.35 1.61 1.47 1.57 1.59 1.89 2.06 
Owned land per aeu in ha  0.36 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.38 
Share of good quality land  0.36  0.32 0.31 0.44 0.36 0.33 0.28 0.39 
Number of dependents  2.50  2.59 2.70 2.68 2.83 2.97 2.84 2.83 
Number of adult male  1.24  1.41 1.65 1.79 1.41 1.54 1.71 1.95 
Number of adult female  1.21  1.33 1.58 1.68 1.36 1.53 1.71 1.93 
Number of oxen  1.20  1.20  1.17 1.29 2.22 1.98 1.99 2.06 
Value of livestock (B)  1,628  1,670 1,771 1,962 2,883 2,839 2,888 3,081 
Value of other animals (B)  857  924  1,026 1,124 1,432 1,309 1,591 1,737 
Roof corrugated iron sheet  0.55  0.60 0.71 0.79 0.61 0.70 0.86 0.91 
Age of household head (years)  44.17 45.66 48.08 49.81 44.87 46.67 48.72 50.46 
Female headed household  0.13  0.12 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.19 
Head can read and write  0.39  0.38 0.35 0.27 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.43 
Value of crop output per ha (B)
  1,926   634   2,596   3,283   2,564   880   2,187   2,804  
Number  of  households  462 463 475 477 229 233 347 356 
Source: Own computation from AAU/Gothenburg/WB Survey 
 
20 Table 4: Plot Level Characteristics by Treatment Category  
  No certificate  With certificate 
 2004-2007  2004-2007 
Plot size in hectares  0.31  0.34 
Number of years possessed  20.84  21.44 
Good soil quality  0.38  0.35 
Medium soil quality  0.37  0.43 
Flat land  0.57  0.72 
Gently sloped land  0.34  0.23 
Irrigated land  0.04  0.04 
Number of observations (plots)  4699  3972 
Source: Own computation from AAU/Gothenburg/WB Survey 
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 None  With  certificate 
  1999 2002 2004 2007 1999 2002 2004 2007 
Expectations of land redistribution in the next five years and of conflict 
Expect change in holdings  0.75 0.62 0.38 0.39 0.78 0.64 0.38 0.24 
Expect an increase in holdings  0.55 0.45 0.19 0.11 0.55 0.36 0.18 0.04 
Expect a decrease in holdings  0.20 0.17 0.19 0.28 0.23 0.27 0.19 0.19 
Concerned about land conflict (p)        0.20        0.14 
Land related investment over the last 12 months (plot level) 
Repaired structure / built new  one     0.36  0.24     0.12  0.25 
Number of hours spent      8.22  5.51      2.26  4.38 
Constructed new structure      0.10  0.08      0.07  0.10 
Plot has conservation structure       0.44  0.34     0.22  0.32 
Participation in land rental market          
Rent-out  land  0.24 0.21 0.29 0.34 0.17 0.15 0.26 0.33 
Area rented out (ha)   0.20  0.21 0.28 0.34 0.14 0.16 0.32 0.45 
Rent-in  land  0.37 0.26 0.20 0.36 0.49 0.31 0.36 0.45 
Area  rented  in  (ha)  0.25 0.19 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.19 0.27 0.44 
Number  of  households  462 463 475 477 229 233 347 356 
Number  of  plots     2284  2415    1886  2086 
Source: Own computation from AAU/Gothenburg/WB Survey. Empty cells imply that no data was available.  
Note: Except where indicated in the table, all variables are at the household level.  
22 Table 6: Impact of certification on perceived land tenure security: Marginal effects from probit model  
  Expect an increase  Expect a decrease 
   Chamberlain  Chamberlain 
Land use certificates issued  -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.093*** -0.095*** 
  (-4.12) (-4.13) (-4.34) (-4.43) 
Relative land size  -0.106*** -0.106*** 0.040***  0.041*** 
 (-7.33)  (-7.31)  (4.11)  (4.26) 
Share of good quality land  0.066**  0.070***  -0.055**  -0.055** 
 (2.52)  (2.66)  (-2.33)  (-2.35) 
Number of dependents  -0.011  -0.001  0.014**  0.019 
 (-1.59)  (-0.05)  (2.38)  (1.57) 
Number of adult male -0.026**  0.008  0.018**  0.027 
 (-2.47)  (0.38)  (2.15)  (1.51) 
Number of adult female -0.019*  -0.033  0.013  0.025 
 (-1.70)  (-1.54)  (1.39)  (1.43) 
Number of oxen  -0.004  0.001  0.011  -0.005 
  (-0.49) (0.08) (1.63) (-0.52) 
Value of other animals x 10
-3 (Birr)  0.006  0.008  -0.002  0.002 
 (1.21)  (1.45)  (-0.72)  (0.52) 
Roof corrugated iron sheet  -0.066***  -0.019  0.052***  0.031 
 (-3.01)  (-0.56)  (2.90)  (1.04) 
Age of household head (years)  -0.015***  -0.016***  0.006*  0.010*** 
 (-3.73)  (-3.70)  (1.77)  (2.62) 
Age of household head squared  0.000***  0.000***  -0.000  -0.000 
 (2.76)  (2.75)  (-1.30)  (-1.39) 
Female headed household -0.032  0.021  -0.049**  -0.062 
 (-1.16)  (0.35)  (-2.13)  (-1.44) 
Household head can read and write  -0.023  0.013  0.032*  0.019 
 (-1.22)  (0.41)  (1.84)  (0.66) 
Year = 2002  -0.093***  -0.098***  -0.012  -0.021 
  (-4.85) (-4.96) (-0.57) (-0.96) 
Year = 2004  -0.243***  -0.253***  -0.049**  -0.070*** 
 (-14.70)  (-13.34)  (-2.38)  (-3.04) 
Year = 2007  -0.320***  -0.333***  0.052*  0.012 
 (-17.17)  (-15.53)  (1.92)  (0.38) 
Number of observations  3042  3042  3042  3042 
Number of households  882  882  882  882 
Log  lik.  -1467.109 -1461.588 -1510.578 -1502.232 
Chi-squared  518.218 517.908 111.531 126.756 
rho  0.070 0.070 0.049 0.046 
sigma_u  0.274 0.274 0.227 0.220 
Lik.-ratio test of rho=0  -1469.227 -1463.689 -1511.736 -1503.235 
Chibar2  4.237 4.204 2.315 2.006 
Note: The dependent variable is whether the household expects an increase or decrease in landholdings over the coming 5 years 
due to land redistribution and reallocation. The Chamberlain specification includes the mean value of the time-varying household 
level variables (Chamberlain 1980), coefficients for which are not reported. A constant term is included in all the regressions. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
23 Table 7: Impact of certification on propensity and magnitude of investment in soil & water conservation: marginal effects  
  Repairs and new investment last 12 
months: porbit models 
Hours spent on repairs and new investment 
last 12 months: tobit models
a 
     Chamberlai
n 
   Chamberlain 
Land use certificates issued  0.268*** 0.302*** 0.291*** 1.279*** 1.439***  1.347*** 
  (9.92) (10.70)  (10.32) (9.90) (10.79)  (10.11) 
Parcel size in hectares  0.019  0.057***  0.061*** 0.205* 0.496*** 0.523*** 
  (1.26) (3.58) (3.80) (1.84) (4.05)  (4.32) 
Number of years possessed  -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.007*  0.011***  0.009** 
  (-0.08) (1.14) (0.61) (1.88) (2.94)  (2.38) 
Good  soil  quality  -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.073 -0.051  -0.056 
  (-1.18) (-1.14) (-1.15) (-0.82) (-0.58)  (-0.64) 
Medium soil quality  -0.013  -0.012 -0.013 -0.090 -0.085  -0.098 
  (-1.18) (-1.17) (-1.23) (-1.06) (-1.01)  (-1.19) 
Flat land  -0.129***  -0.121***  -0.121*** -1.075*** -1.023***  -1.002*** 
  (-6.02) (-5.92) (-5.89) (-8.44) (-8.14)  (-8.09) 
Gently sloped land  -0.025  -0.025* -0.023  -0.261**  -0.245** -0.213* 
  (-1.54) (-1.69) (-1.57) (-2.20) (-2.09)  (-1.84) 
Irrigated land  0.017  0.019 0.019 0.101 0.091  0.087 
  (0.72) (0.86) (0.83) (0.60) (0.55)  (0.53) 
Total owned land in hectares    -0.058***  -0.062***    -0.335***  -0.357*** 
   (-6.81)  (-7.24)  (-6.53)  (-7.06) 
Value of livestock x 10
-3  (Birr)  -0.003*  -0.003*  -0.017*  -0.012 
   (-1.91)  (-1.86)  (-1.86)  (-1.01) 
Corrugated  iron  roof   0.017  -0.035  0.122  -0.355* 
   (0.92)  (-1.21)  (0.98)  (-1.91) 
Number of dependents    0.009  0.024***    0.089***  0.248*** 
   (1.41)  (2.59)  (2.61)  (3.78) 
Number of adult male   0.013  0.015   0.080*  0.038 
   (1.62)  (1.26)  (1.76)  (0.42) 
Number of adult female   0.001  0.018*    -0.032  0.093 
   (0.17)  (1.66)    (-0.68)  (1.16) 
Age of household head (years)    0.006  0.007    0.055**  0.038 
   (1.38)  (1.50)  (2.32)  (1.54) 
Age of household head squared    -0.000*  -0.000***    -0.001***  -0.001*** 
   (-1.65)  (-2.65)  (-2.64)  (-3.04) 
Female headed household   -0.042**  0.068    -0.458***  0.510* 
   (-2.05)  (1.47)  (-3.14)  (1.77) 
Head can read and write    -0.010  0.010    -0.093  0.061 
   (-0.67)  (0.56)  (-0.97)  (0.46) 
Year  =  2007  -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.053*** -0.350*** -0.357***  -0.260*** 
  (-6.08) (-5.63) (-4.41) (-4.56) (-4.45)  (-2.93) 
Number  of  observations  8671 8671 8671 8671 8671  8671 
Number  of  households  856 856 856 856 856  856 
Log likelihood  -3662.079  -3625.047  -3596.866 -9747.794 -9713.545  -9686.255 
Chi-squared 294.122  348.923 387.019 293.521 361.972  419.962 
Rho  0.672 0.656 0.647 0.619 0.603  0.594 
sigma_u 1.432  1.380  1.354 7.439 7.175  7.023 
Lik.-ratio test of rho=0 -4760.517  -4613.590  -4555.439       
Chibar
2 2196.876  1977.085  1917.145       
Note: The Chamberlain specification includes the mean value of the time-varying household level variables (Chamberlain 1980), 
coefficients for which are not reported. A constant term is included in all the regressions. Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
aThe dependent variable is log((number of hours spent on repairs and new investment last 12 months + 0.01)/0.01). 
24 Table 8: Certification impact on rental market participation: marginal effects from probit models  
 Rented-out  Rented-in 
   Chamberlain  Chamberlain 
Land use certificates issued  0.097*  0.134**  0.126**  -0.002 -0.014 -0.010 
  (1.82) (2.35) (2.38) (-0.04)  (-0.32)  (-0.23) 
Total owned land in hectares  0.062*** 0.065*** 0.055*** -0.099***  -0.103***  -0.091*** 
  (4.98) (5.30) (4.77) (-5.75)  (-5.88)  (-5.81) 
Share of good quality land  -0.001  -0.016 -0.032 -0.061 -0.050 -0.053 
  (-0.03) (-0.37) (-0.74) (-1.34) (-1.14) (-1.19) 
Number of dependents  -0.007  -0.006 0.001 0.016 -0.029 -0.019 
  (-0.66) (-0.25) (0.04) (1.31) (-1.17) (-0.79) 
Number of adult male  -0.025  -0.028 -0.031 -0.010  -0.061*  -0.044 
  (-1.63) (-0.78) (-0.87) (-0.62) (-1.71) (-1.24) 
Number of adult female  0.024 0.006 0.021 -0.001  -0.015  -0.009 
  (1.48) (0.19) (0.68) (-0.05)  (-0.49)  (-0.27) 
Number of oxen  -0.181***  -0.080***  -0.086***  0.134***  0.077***  0.089*** 
  (-9.93) (-3.54) (-3.87) (7.76)  (3.39)  (3.91) 
Value of other animals x 10
-3 (Birr)  -0.018**  -0.002  0.003  0.014***  0.011  0.008 
  (-2.50)  (-0.24) (0.35) (2.65) (1.61) (1.01) 
Roof corrugated iron sheet  -0.088**  -0.057  -0.078  0.113***  0.104**  0.114** 
  (-2.00) (-0.87) (-1.17) (3.24)  (2.10)  (2.15) 
Age of household head (years)  -0.005  -0.012*  -0.011*  -0.001  0.004  0.007 
  (-0.75) (-1.69) (-1.65) (-0.15) (0.41)  (0.85) 
Age of household head squared  0.000* 0.000* 0.000* -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (1.70) (1.72) (1.69) (-0.92) (0.02) (-0.52) 
Female headed household  0.373*** 0.143  0.225**  -0.204***  -0.148**  -0.177*** 
  (5.87) (1.39) (2.19) (-7.70)  (-2.53)  (-2.61) 
Household head can read and write  0.067* 0.082 0.090 -0.019 0.019 0.038 
  (1.81) (1.41) (1.54) (-0.57) (0.37) (0.74) 
Initial  year  participation  as  landlord     0.124***     
     (2.83)     
Lagged  participation  as  landlord     0.332***     
     (7.51)     
Initial  year  participation  as  tenant        0.174*** 
        ( 5 . 3 0 )  
Lagged  participation  as  tenant       0.273*** 
        ( 7 . 4 4 )  
Year = 2007  0.086***  0.067**  0.032  0.163***  0.163***  0.171*** 
  (2.74) (2.09) (0.90) (5.09) (4.76) (4.65) 
Number  of  observations  1424 1424 1302 1424 1424 1302 
Number  of  households  736 736 736 736 736 736 
Log  lik.  -579.050 -554.254 -462.474 -657.789 -645.424 -553.642 
Chi-squared 231.821  212.860 408.046 160.423 157.457 348.339 
Rho  0.395 0.424 0.038 0.502 0.502 0.038 
sigma_u 0.807  0.857  0.199 1.003 1.005 0.200 
Lik.-ratio test of rho=0  -591.925 -568.202 -461.949 -680.949 -668.285 -553.291 
Chibar2  25.749 27.896  1.050  46.319 45.722  0.701 
Note: The Chamberlain specification includes the mean value of the time-varying household level variables (Chamberlain 1980), 
but not reported. A constant term is included in all the regressions. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
25 Table 9: Certification impact on size of land rented: marginal effects from tobit models  
  Land rented-out  Land rented-in 
   Chamberlain  Chamberlain 
Land use certificates issued 0.073**  0.088***  0.092***  0.016  0.007  0.020 
  (2.30) (2.77) (2.83) (0.65) (0.29) (0.78) 
Total owned land in hectares  0.086*** 0.086*** 0.074*** -0.059***  -0.061***  -0.051*** 
 (10.88)  (11.07)  (9.54)  (-6.24)  (-6.48)  (-5.45) 
Share of good quality land  0.022 0.013 -0.002 0.003 0.008 0.006 
  (0.82) (0.50) (-0.09) (0.10) (0.31) (0.25) 
Number of dependents  -0.010  -0.002 -0.003 0.008 -0.013 -0.017 
  (-1.32) (-0.10) (-0.23) (1.14) (-0.96) (-1.25) 
Number of adult male  -0.013  -0.016 -0.027 -0.000  -0.041**  -0.039* 
  (-1.33) (-0.70) (-1.18) (-0.03) (-2.00) (-1.88) 
Number of adult female  0.016 0.008 0.016 -0.001  -0.004  -0.003 
 (1.53)  (0.41)  (0.83)  (-0.10)  (-0.20)  (-0.17) 
Number of oxen  -0.152***  -0.094***  -0.095***  0.075***  0.041***  0.044*** 
 (-13.29)  (-6.24)  (-6.30)  (8.56)  (3.29)  (3.34) 
Value of other animals x 10
-3 (Birr)  -0.013***  -0.003  0.003  0.011***  0.009**  0.006 
  (-2.69)  (-0.50) (0.52) (3.71) (2.10) (1.37) 
Roof corrugated iron sheet  -0.055**  -0.054  -0.061  0.069***  0.063*  0.073** 
 (-2.15)  (-1.38)  (-1.50)  (2.88)  (1.83)  (2.18) 
Age of household head (years)  -0.006  -0.009**  -0.008*  -0.002  0.001  0.002 
  (-1.40) (-2.29) (-1.79) (-0.43) (0.24)  (0.47) 
Age of household head squared  0.000*** 0.000**  0.000**  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (2.61) (2.32) (1.99) (-0.67) (0.34) (-0.04) 
Female headed household  0.191*** 0.076  0.096*  -0.166***  -0.119**  -0.122** 
 (5.47)  (1.42)  (1.68)  (-6.41)  (-2.36)  (-2.47) 
Household head can read and write  0.051** 0.063* 0.088** -0.002  0.002  0.016 
  (2.10) (1.69) (2.25) (-0.13) (0.08) (0.51) 
Initial value of rented-out land in ha      0.035       
     (1.57)     
Lag of rented-out land in hectares      0.082***       
     (3.48)     
Initial value of rented-in land in ha            0.112*** 
        (6.34) 
Lag of rented-in land in hectares            0.137*** 
        (8.37) 
Year = 2007  0.052***  0.047**  0.039*  0.078***  0.082***  0.077*** 
  (2.61) (2.34) (1.81) (4.23) (4.13) (3.50) 
Number  of  observations  1424 1424 1302 1424 1424 1302 
Number  of  households  736 736 736 736 736 736 
Log lik.  -980.509  -960.667  -819.983 -1001.082 -987.542  -863.362 
Chi-squared 481.280  523.044 538.654 306.883 329.675 442.059 
Rho  0.307 0.326 0.188 0.283 0.289 0.000 
sigma_u 0.600  0.606  0.442 0.507 0.506 0.000 
Note: The Chamberlain specification includes the mean value of the time-varying household level variables (Chamberlain 1980), 
but not reported. A constant term is included in all the regressions. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
26 Appendix table 1: Determinants of value of crop output: household fixed effect estimates  
  Value of crop output (log) 
Plot has soil and water conservation structures  0.091*** 
  (5.60) 
Plot size (hectares)  0.276*** 
  (23.56) 
Male adult labor (days)  0.334*** 
  (21.84) 
Female adult labor (days)  -0.001 
  (0.09) 
Hired labor (days)  0.023 
  (1.16) 
Oxen (days)  0.128*** 
  (10.96) 
Chemical fertilizer (kg)  0.155*** 
  (14.54) 
Manure (kg)  0.027** 
  (2.27) 
Dummy female family labor
a  -0.011 
  (0.31) 
Dummy hired labor
a  -0.087** 
  (2.33) 
Dummy chemical fertilizer
a 0.125*** 
  (3.40) 
Dummy manure
a  0.213*** 
  (2.92) 
Number of year possessed  -0.000 
  (0.02) 
Good soil quality  0.185*** 
  (9.55) 
Medium soil quality  0.110*** 
  (6.12) 
Flat land  0.031 
  (0.97) 
Gently sloped land  0.055* 
  (1.70) 
Irrigated land  0.138*** 
  (3.47) 
Year = 2002  -0.884*** 
  (42.02) 
Year = 2004  0.383*** 
  (18.25) 
Year = 2007  0.671*** 
  (32.09) 
Constant  4.259*** 
  (40.46) 
Number of observations  11689 
Number of households  844 
R
2  0.554 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
aThe value of the dummy is 1 if the input is not used, and the value is 0 if the input is used. All inputs are in logs.  
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